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Abstract
Countries with small financial systems are  generally small  minimum core of sound banks and insurance companies,
economies  with a reduced  dimension  of institutional  sound  and credible macroeconomic  policies,  and open
relationships,  a greater concentration  of wealth, and a  capital  accounts  can benefit from the development of
relatively less independent civil service.  These  contractual  savings. This can increase the options to
characteristics  facilitate concentration  of functions and,  obtain sound coverage against contingencies,  increase the
more generally,  weak governance.  Only small economies  supply of long term savings, promote financial
with a relatively high level of per capita income,  deepening,  and improve financial  risk management.
This paper-a product of the Financial Sector Development Department-is  part of a larger effort in the department to
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at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The authors  may be contacted at gimpavido@worldbank.org,  amusalem@worldbank.org,
or dvittas@worldbank.org.  May 2002. (30 pages)
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INTRODUCTION
At present, 49% and 32% of the world workforce (approximately  800m) is covered by
mandatory, publicly managed defined benefit (DB) pay-as-you-go (PAYG)  and partially
funded schemes, respectively.  The rest of the workforce is covered by a mix of public
DB and private defined contribution  (DC).  Only  10-15%  of  it is covered by public
and/or private DC schemes.  In mature economies with flat demographic  pyramids like
Poland, Italy and Slovenia, universal coverage is norm, public pension spending can
reach  15% of GDP, and gross implicit pension debt can be as high as 400% of GDP.
Ageing of population  is bound to increase pressure on countries to reform their pension
systems and so far, at least 12 countries have adopted radical reforms and some other 20
countries are in the process of formulating serious reform proposals.
The alternatives of allowing for massive immigration and/or delaying considerably the
compulsory retirement  age, or to reduce benefits or increase contributions to
maintain/improve  the financial viability of unfunded schemes are not politically feasible
and this will encourage increased funding of pension liabilities in the future.  The trends
that emerge from the recent wave of reforms are:  i) more funding of current liabilities; ii)
more private management of assets; iii) more DC schemes; and iv) more individual
responsibility and choice.
This paper heavily draws on work carried out in the Financial Sector Development
Department of the World Bank studying the impact of contractual  savings (pensions and
life insurance) institution development on financial markets]  and related work carried out
within the Financial Sector Vice Presidency  of the World Bank2. The value added of this
paper is in the identification  of policy options and possible sequencing for the successful
development of contractual  savings in countries  with small financial markets.  The
development of contractual savings is associated here to the development of a funded
pensions pillar.  No specific position is here taken  on the issue of public and private
sector participation  in the provision of pensions or on the design details of the private
component.
The paper is organized in the following way.  Section I discusses  the specificity of
small financial systems.  Section II discusses the minimum pre-requisites  for the
successful development of contractual  savings.  Section III discusses the likely benefits
for the rest of the financial sector of the development of contractual  savings in small
financial  systems.  Section IV discusses the options available to policy makers in these
countries to provide private pensions.  Conclusions follow in Section V.
I  WHAT CHARACTERIZES  COUNTRIES  WITH  SMALL FINANCIAL
SECTORS?
Small financial  sectors are usually found in small, open economies  with small population.
Table 1 lists 87 countries with M2 less than US$ 5 billion, for which 1999 data was
' See Catalan et al.  (2001), Impavido and Musalem  (2000), Impavido et al.  (2001a and 2001b), Vittas
(1998a andl998b)  and the papers there referenced.
2 See Glaessner and Valdds-Prieto  (1998) and Bossone et al.  (2001).
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simultaneously available for M2, GDP, population, imports of goods and services and
export of goods and services
Table  1: Countries with small financial sectors,  1999
M2~  GDP  Per capita 
Country  (US$  (US$  GDP  Population  Openness.  M2IGDP 000000y  oloooo)  000000)  (us$)  (000)  (X  + MyGDP  (0/a)
Sao Tome  and Principe  11.46  46.40  319.44  145.26  119.31  24.71
Comoros  40.49  209.10  384.18  544.28  66.74  19.36
Equatorial  Guinea  57.11  873.39  1,972.97  442.68  188.21  6.54
Guinea-Bissau  66.22  239.57  202.22  1,184.67  69.57  27.64
Guinea  71.74  1,280.36  176.59  7,250.52  44.88  5.60
Sierra Leone  107.62  775.80  156.75  4,949.34  34.13  13.87
Gambia,  The  129.03  415.50  332.14  1,251.00  117.14  31.05
Mauritania  135.47  968.08  372.58  2,598.33  87.77  13.99
Niger  150.34  2,162.50  206.04  10,495.60  38.35  6.95
Chad  166.93  1,510.31  201.76  7,485.61  47.33  11.05
Burundi  169.35  850.92  127.42  6,677.95  27.09  19.90
Kyrgyz  Republic  169.74  1,429.68  293.89  4,864.60  99.20  11.87
Central African Republic  175.96  1,107.98  313.00  3,539.81  40.90  15.88
Dominica  195.96  278.49  3,814.89  73.00  124.97  70.36
Bhutan  196.60  500.80  640.62  781.75  75.00  39.26
Armenia  204.56  1,965.31  515.98  3,808.86  70.67  10.41
Georgia  220.77  2,961.94  543.28  5,452.00  73.01  7.45
St.  Kitts and Nevis  236.33  306.26  7,491.70  40.88  118.14  77.17
Moldova  239.64  1,365.33  318.93  4,281.02  114.82  17.55
St.  Vincent and the Grenadines  244.09  353.58  3,099.43  114.08  122.76  69.03
Malawi  271.60  2,022.20  187.45  10,787.80  69.63  13.43
Rwanda  295.58  2,030.63  _244.36  83140.00  26.71  -14.56
Grenada  338.44  389.01  4,010.39  97.00  125.40  87.00
Congo, Rep.  342.49  2,417.89  845.78  2,858.76  148.43  14.16
Togo  347.08  1,461.54  320.03  4,566.94  70.35  23.75
Cape Verde  348.85  620.80  1,451.17  427.79  73.51  56.19
Swaziland  364.24  1,311.76  1,286.71  1,019.47  205.20  27.77
Belize  400.31  783.86  3,175.45  246.85  107.26  51.07
St.  Lucia  453.94  680.14  4,410.78  154.20  126.23  66.74
Guyana  458.54  712.70  832.67  855.92  206.11  64.34
Turkmenistan  490.86  3,641.08  761.84  4,779.33  103.53  13.48
Antigua  and Barbuda  512.96  669.80  9,933.25  67.43  158.36  76.58
Azerbaijan  529.93  4,390.58  549.99  7,983.00  84.45  12.07
Seychelles  544.62  599.36  7,489.17  80.03  159.36  90.87
Zambia  585.38  3,533.03  357.55  9,881.21  63.11  16.57
Mali  589.69  2,583.30  244.08  10,583.70  60.90  22.83
Burkina Faso  593.33  2,612.71  237.61  10,995.70  40.71  22.71
Benin  618.54  2,720.24  444.92  6,114.05  44.75  22.74
Macedonia, FYR  661.51  3,904.75  1,932.22  2,020.86  97.21  16.94
Gabon  724.09  4,286.11  3,546.90  1,208.41  83.47  16.89
Madagascar  740.15  4,045.69  268.81  15,050.50  57.41  18.29
Fiji  784.98  1,874.50  2,340.19  801.00  131.39  41.88
Uganda  878.02  6,383.84  297.21  21,479.30  34.21  13.75
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Country  (US$.  (US$  GDP  Population  Openness  M2/GDP
000000)  000000)  (US$)  (000)  (X  + MYIGDP  (%/)
Mozambique  1,013.01  4,524.69  261.56  17,299.00  49.23  22.39
Senegal  1,158.02  5,045.08  543.34  9,285.31  71.81  22.95
Papua New Guinea  1,160.11  3,696.25  785.66  4,704.62  86.84  31.39
Zimbabwe  1,226.72  6,462.45  542.89  11,903.70  90.90  18.98
Cameroon  1,371.07  9,327.75  634.95  14,690.50  49.34  14.70
Namibia  1,387.39  3,333.21  1,959.18  1,701.33  116.24  41.62
Haiti  1,445.06  4,745.99  608.23  7,803.00  40.10  30.45
Ghana  1,451.95  8,356.84  444.88  18,784.50  83.99  17.37
Nicaragua  1,510.68  2,462.86  500.71  4,918.75  122.28  61.34
Botswana  1,563.07  5,588.50  3,518.94  1,588.12  60.58  27.97
Tanzania  1,634.80  9,504.03  288.68  32,922.60  41.32  17.20
Barbados  1,667.87  2,632.43  9,871.13  266.68  105.80  63.36
Estonia  1,766.65  5,697.99  3,950.38  1,442.39  159.48  31.00
Latvia  1,773.97  6,506.79  2,676.48  2,431.10  104.33  27.26
Albania  2,127.02  4,044.76  1,198.36  3,375.23  41.26  52.59
Lithuania  2,243.00  11,029.97  2,981.88  3,699.00  90.05  20.34
Kazakhstan  2,291.44  20,542.02  1,376.17  14,927.00  85.31  11.15
Ethiopia  2,392.45  6,302.06  100.38  62,782.00  43.12  37.96
Yemen,  Rep.  2,408.90  7,270.50  426.48  17,047.60  84.01  33.13
Nepal  2,412.51  5,458.67  233.43  23,384.20  52.98  44.20
Honduras  2,452.62  5,979.70  946.51  6,317.65  99.64  41.02
Paraguay  2,512.10  8,168.30  1,524.27  5,358.84  59.70  30.75
Cote d'lvoire  2,721.67  11,111.17  714.75  15,545.50  81.84  24.49
Iceland  2,747.80  8,180.17  29,478.09  277.50  71.98  33.59
Trnidad and Tobago  3,349.43  6,982.68  5,401.42  1,292.75  93.43  47.97
Jamaica  3,357.67  7,491.04  2,883.39  2,598.00  - 107.42-  44.82
Mauritius  3,448.51  4,543.82  3,869.06  1,174.40  132.67  75.89
Bulgana  3,765.03  13,097.57  1,595.71  8,208.00  96.03  28.75
Bolivia  4,106.27  8,593.43  1,055.96  8,138.00  44.44  47.78
Guatemala  4,217.05  19,381.44  1,747.90  11,088.40  46.38  21.76
Kenya  4,668.15  10,959.48  372.64  29,410.00  55.59  42.59
Costa Rica  5,040.48  16,691.72  4,650.80  3,589.00  100.94  30.20
Source: WBI
Table 2 reports the correlation among these variables for  1999.  For this year, the
correlation between  the size of the financial sector (M2) and the size of the economy
(GDP), openness (imports and exports over GDP), wealth (per capita GDP), and
population3 was 0.94, - 0.14, 0.50, and 0.30, respectively.  In other words, countries with
small financial systems (M2) tend to have smaller and shallower financial  markets, tend
4 to be poorer, with smaller population,  and more open4.
Small countries cannot fully exploit the economies of scale and scope in the provision
of financial  services.  The reduced population limits the amount and quality of human
3 From the contractual savings point of view the variable "labor force" would be more appropriate.  We
assume that a very high and significant correlation  exists between total population and labor force.
4Although the correlation is significantly different from zero at only  12%.
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capital they can draw upon.  The lack of resources  limits the scope for the development
of the financial infrastructure  like payment systems, organized markets, supervision,  and
regulation; sunk costs are simply too high for poorer countries.  As a consequence,  small
financial markets are generally  shallow, incomplete, poorly regulated,  illiquid, prone to
lack of competition and concentration in the provision of services, inefficient,  and
characterized by relatively high transaction costs.  Small economies  are more volatile:
their median standard deviation of private consumption, terms of trade, inflation,  GDP
growth, and capital flows per GDP is between  1.5 and 4 times higher than in larger
countries (Bossone et al.  2001).  All this, in turn, impairs investment and hence, growth.
Table 2: Correlation matrix
M2  GDP  PerCGDapita  Population  Openness  M2/GDP
M2  1.0000
p-value
GDP  0.9404  1.0000
p-value  [0.0000]
Per capita GDP  0.4992  0.4651  1.0000
p-value  [0.0000]  [0.0000]
Population  0.3001  0.2664  -0.0099  1.0000
p-value  [0.0001]  [0.0012]  [0.9058]
Openness  -0.1405  -0.1919  0.1049  -0.2098  1.0000
p-value  [0.1165]  [0.0313]  10.2424]  [0.0105)
M2/GDP  0.2719  0.1746  0.5516  0.2025  0.3671  1.0000
p-value  [0.0009]  [0.0356]  [0.0000]  [0.0139]  [0.0000]
Notes:  The correlation coefficient was calculated over the pair-wise available observations within a sample of
158 countries.
Source:  WBI and authors'  calculations.
Despite the risks associated with openness, it is widely recognized that as trade
openness can compensate for the underdevelopment of the real sector, financial
liberalization allows to achieve the economies of scale and scope otherwise forbidden.
This involves allowing foreign ownership of intermediaries,  cross border financial
transactions,  participation in regional markets, the creation of regional infrastructure  like
regional organized markets, or regulatory and supervisory agencies,  having sound and
credible macroeconomic policies, opening of the capital  accounts, and establishing
exchange rate regimes that facilitate international integration.  In a sense, small financial
systems could integrate with larger systems as regions integrate within country.
In the next sections  we discuss the financial  preconditions for the successful
development of contractual  savings in small financial systems, the policy options
available to policymakers for their development, and the likely externalities  for the rest of
the financial sector.Contractual Savings  In Countries With A Small Financial Sector
1I  PRECONDITIONS  FOR CONTRACTUAL  SAVINGS
DEVELOPMENT
Clearly, if a fully-fledged and efficient financial  system and institutions  were a pre-
requisite for the successful development of private pension schemes, few countries in the
world would be able to undertake  systemic pension reform.  However, the experience of
countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe suggests that, unless reformers  aim to
begin with a nearly perfect system  with low costs, high returns and highly diversified risk,
an objective that would be both unnecessary and counter-productive,  the practical
preconditions  are far less demanding.  Instead of a fully-fledged financial system with a
whole array of dynamically efficient institutions  and the full range of financial
instruments, what seems to be needed (Vittas 2000) are: i) a hard core of sound banks and
insurance companies;  ii) a long-term commitment by government to pursue financial
sector reforms signaled, among other, by the implementation  of sound macroeconomic
policies; and iii) a long-term commitment for the creation of a sound regulatory and
supervisory framework.
ILA  Sound banks and insurance companies
Countries where the dominant banks and insurance companies  are state-owned,
financially insolvent and operationally inept are unlikely to succeed in their reform
programs.  Banks need to inspire confidence that they will be able to collect and transfer
funds to their rightful owners,  while insurance companies must be able to offer the basic
insurance policies needed for a successful reform program.  Funded pensions typically
hold some bank assets, so weak banks threaten retirement income security (Mitchell
1998).  Banks  are also necessary  (as providers of collateral,  clearing, settlement etc.
services) for security markets to grow and provide alternative pension fund investments.
Nevertheless, the role of banks and insurance  companies in the early years of pension
reform can be easily exaggerated.  The collection of contributions, their allocation to the
accounts of their rightful owners, and the direction  of accumulated funds to the selected
asset management companies are parts of a major logistical exercise that requires
considerable preparation and development of computerized systems, but it does not
require fully developed banking and insurance sectors5.
Two aspects of the operation of pension funds are of crucial importance  and may
explain the insulation of pension funds from the adverse effects of widespread banking
crises.  The first is the effective segregation of pension fund assets from the assets of the
management company and the financial group to which it belongs.  And the second is the
safe custody of pension fund assets.  To ensure asset segregation,  a country, small or
large, needs a legal rule that mandates  it and a pro-actively effective  supervision to
5In Chile, the new pension system became operational in May 1981,  but was not seriously affected by the
collapse of the entire banking  system in 1982-3.  The pension funds placed their assets in govemment
bonds and waited for the restoration of banking soundness before investing again some of their funds in
bank deposits.  In Argentina and Mexico, the gyrations of the banking systems did not have an adverse
effect on the fledgling pension funds that were operated, more often than not, by subsidiaries  of the same
banks that faced serious financial problems.  Banks in Eastem European countries, such as the Czech
Republic  and Hungary, have been in weak financial condition but this did not impede the implementation
of systemic pension reform and creation of funded pension pillars.
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ensure compliance.  Safe custody requires the presence of an institution with the financial,
human and technical resources  to fulfill this function.  In the absence of sound and
efficient local banks, two solutions suggest  themselves.  Either the central bank can
perform this demanding function if it has the inclination and resources6. Or one or other
of the global custodial banks, such as State Street, Northern Trust, Morgan  Chase or
Citigroup, can be invited to perform this function7. The development of central securities
depositories and the concomitant  dematerialization  of marketable securities have made
the offer of custodial  services somewhat easier and more economical, but the issue
remains an important one.
AI.B  Long term government commitment
Long-term government commitment is very important because pension reforms need to
be accompanied by extensive reforms in fiscal and financial policies as well as capital
and labor markets.  While the absence of well-developed capital markets is not a major
obstacle at the beginning of the pension reform program, mainly because the assets of the
pension funds will be very small at first, capital market reform is a must in the long run
as pension fund assets will continue to grow steadily over time.  This is in fact one of the
main characteristics  of long-term contractual  savings.  Countries have between five and
ten years to reform their capital markets and expand the range of available financial
instruments, but unless they succeed in these reforms the funded pillar of the pension
system will be unable to fulfill its fundamental objective, which is to contribute to the
provision of better and more secure pensions to retiring workers.
The long term commitment of govemments  is signaled by the adoption of sound and
credible macroecomic  policies.  Institutional investors cannot survive in high and volatile
macroeconomic  environment even if indexed instruments are used.  Fiscal policies must
be prudent.  As long as the levels of nominal debt are too high, long term maturities are
not attainable as the credibility of the antinflationary  stance of the government is
undermined (Missale and Blanchard  1994).  Thus the beneficial impact from lengthening
the maturity of debt to shield economies from financial  crises may be undermined.
Governments  can always be tempted to devalue the currency  at any given point in time.
Finally, the use of contractual  savings as captive sources of funding undermines the
credibility of the monetary and fiscal policies.  Expectations and risk premia do not
decrease and debt managers are saddled with high long term interest rates.
Finally, the adoption of sound macroeconomic  policies and the existence of sound
banks and insurance  companies would allow small countries to keep their capital account
open and permit free trade of international financial services.  As Kotlikoff (1999:  10)
puts it "Indeed,  there is ample evidence  that the world capital market waits with bited
breath to invest in those countries that have transparent and sound economic policies.
6 In Chile, the central bank was the only authorized  custodial institution for the pension system for at least
the first ten years of its existence.
7Despite the importance of asset segregation and safe custody, it is important to note that few, if any,
OECD countries impose sufficiently robust requirements for them.  In Britain,  the infamous Maxwell case,
that occurred in the late 1980s, has resulted in some tightening of the custodial rules, but neither there nor
in any other leading country are there requirements for a strict segregation of assets  and safe custody by a
totally independent custodian.  In this respect, Chile is still a leader among countries  with funded pension
pillars.
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There's also ample and very recent evidence  that, at a moment's notice,  global capital
will flee developing countries that do not have such policies".  This, as we will see,
allows  small countries to overcome many of the obstacle in developing contractual
savings stemming from their small  size.
1.  C  Sound regulation and supervision
Governments  should finally be committed to the creation of a sound and robust
supervisory and regulatory frameworks.  This does not necessarily mean that a
sophisticated supervisory  authority or regulation be in place as preconditions for the
development of contractual  savings.  As we will see in the next section regulation and
supervision  involve sunk costs and need developing together with the development of the
institutions and if the country can afford not to rely on foreign specialization manage
these functions locally.  However, minimum regulation  and supervision should be in
place to ensuring that only qualified institutions obtain licenses, that contributions are
paid in a timely manner, and that contractual terms are enforced.  Over time, the
regulatory agency could develop all its other functions, including the creation of a strong
capability in undertaking off-site surveillance and conducting on-site inspections  and
contract out whatever function deems necessary.
In the next section we discuss the benefits linked to the development of contractual
savings for small financial  systems.
III  BENEFITS  FOR SMALL FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
In general, small financial markets display different degrees of integration with the rest of
the world and have different quality of macroeconomic  policies, banking, and insurance
sectors.  This has an impact on their ability to benefit from the development  of
contractual savings.  For the sake of exposition,  small financial markets can be grouped
in three categories:  i) those that are incomplete but the segments that operate are sound,
and are associated with high per capita income, credible macroeconomic policies, have
open capital accounts  (but domestic and international financial instruments are not
perfect substitutes);  ii) those that are incomplete but the segments that operate are
predominantly unsound and stagnant,  are associated with low per capita income, non-
credible macroeconomic  policies (due, for instance, to a long history of macroeconomic
imbalances) and closed capital accounts;  and iii) those that have intermediate positions
between the previous two.
The first case of small incomplete  and sound financial systems with relatively high per
capita income, credible macroeconomic policies,  and free capital movements  (e.g.,
Iceland, Malta, and Cyprus) offer the best case for contractual  savings development.
Several reasons account for this: i) contractual  savings is a luxury financial  service which
is demanded at high rather than at low per capita income (i.e., at high per capita income
the time preference or discount rate is lower, thus increasing the valuation of purchasing
coverage for future contingencies,  also family ties could be weaker which reduce self
insurance within the family); ii) credible macroeconomic  policy provides an enabling
environment for the development of long term financial instruments (e.g., contractual
savings); iii) even under incomplete financial markets (e.g.,  embryonic capital markets),
but where sound banks are operating, they provide a vehicle for channeling long term
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savings as long term loans to borrowers  (government, enterprises,  and individuals);  and
iv) open capital accounts do not constraint contractual saving institutions to invest in the
local market.
There would be several benefits that could be obtained from the development of
contractual  savings in small incomplete  and sound financial systems:  i) it could increase
the options to the population and enterprises to obtain sound coverage against
contingencies  (e.g., longevity, death, unemployment, severance payments); ii) it could
increase the supply of long term savings thus promoting financial deepening and
innovation, and improve financial risk management; iii) it may increase the national
saving rate; iv) it could foster economic growth.
The development of contractual  savings covering adequate regulations,  supervision and
tax treatment could provide the incentives for increasing the demand for these products
beyond what could have been the case through off shore purchases of similar products.
The higher demand could trigger the establishment of local companies as well as
subsidiaries or branches of foreign providers.  The location of the industry within the
country may create opportunities for investments in the country rather than outside by
increasing knowledge of the local investment markets.  Also their presence may
encourage the creation of domestic  venture capital funds which could identify investment
projects worth financing which otherwise would not had happened.  Investments of
contractual  savings institutions  based on the prudent investor rule would be composed  of
long term deposits in local and foreign banks, capital market instruments (government
and corporate bonds, asset backed securities  and shares)  which most likely would be
traded abroad, since the local  market would be too small to develop a capital market, and
small equity investments in domestic and foreign venture capital funds, and in leasing
companies.
--Mandatory-contributions  to cntra-rual-  saving plans could increase  the national slaving
rate if some members of the population do not have sufficient access to credit.  Under
these conditions,  they would be forced to save more since they would not be able to
smooth out their consumption over their life cycle.  In addition, the national saving rate
would increase if governments do not take these funds as captive source of finance.
Contractual savings development  would foster growth because it has the potential to
increase national saving, hence investments.  In addition, contractual savings institutions
would require a lower liquidity and premia because of their long term liabilities, thus
reducing the cost of capital which in turn would increase investments and foster growth.
Furthermore,  the development of contractual  savings would reduce refinancing risks of
borrowers  (governments, enterprises and individuals) while funding contingent liabilities.
Also banks would be able to lend long term  while reducing their term transformation
risks.  The improvement in risk management would reduce the country risk premium and
interest rates which will foster investments and growth.  Finally, the development of
contractual savings by increasing  long term savings will flatten the term structure of
interest rate thus encouraging the undertaking of longer maturity investment projects.
Since they have  a higher rate of retum, would also foster economic growth.
The second type of countries, those with chronic macroeconomic  imbalances  and other
limitations,  as spelled out above, provide very little room for the development of
contractual  savings.  Long term saving instruments cannot prosper in a macroeconomic
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environment with high and volatile inflation, and contractual  savings are unaffordable at
low per capita income.  Furthermore,  these countries financial systems are limited to
banks and they are usually weak institutions.  Although it would be possible to invest
abroad, these countries by having weak domestic financial institutions should have closed
capital accounts.  Hence, before trying to develop these instruments, the authorities
should focus on establishing a credible long term macroeconomic  framework and to
strengthen banks prudential regulation and supervision.
In the intermediary category of small financial systems, there is a whole variety of
cases.  Let us consider countries with a credible macroeconomic  policy, a relatively
sound banking system, and an open capital account (e.g., Bulgaria, Costa Rica,
Botswana).  However, with incomplete  financial markets (underdeveloped securities
markets,  insurance,  mortgages), and low to medium per capita income.  These countries
have the preconditions for developing contractual  savings, although  the low to medium
per capita income will constrain activity.  Initially,  the portfolio of contractual  savings
intermediaries  would show primarily government bonds and banks long term certificate
of deposits.  In addition, they could have small fractions in shares, and foreign securities,
and possibly in leasing companies.  Gradually,  investment regulations  should allow more
diversified portfolios as financial markets develop, by allowing higher investments in
shares, foreign securities, corporate bonds, asset backed securities, and a small share in
venture capital companies.
Information  on small on portfolio allocation of pension fund in small financial systems
is not readily available.  However,  inference can be drawn from the experience of
countries with larger financial system at present but that could be categorized as countries
with small financial  system when private pension planes were launched.  Figure 1 reports
the changes in the investment allocation in financial  assets of the Chilean pension funds.
As of 1997, pension funds had 7% of financial assets in cash and deposits,66% in bills
and bonds, 24% in shares, and 3% in other securities.  Since inception  in 1981,  Chilean
pension funds have gradually reduced their holdings in cash, deposits and debt, whilst
they increased the proportion of assets in stocks since this type of investment was
authorized.  This is in part due to the relaxation of the investment regulation  on specific
assets.  At the beginning of Chile's pension reform, the investment regulations  allowed
up to  100 percent in government securities, up to 60 percent in corporate bonds, and up to
70 percent in each of the following categories:  mortgage-backed  securities, letters of
credit or fixed term deposits.  As the market developed,  regulations were relaxed to
allow investments in shares8, mutual funds, real estate funds, venture capital funds,
securitized credit funds, foreign securities and hedging instruments.
8 Shares were first allowed in pension funds portfolios in 1985.
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Notice that the increasing trend in the share of equities and bills and bonds in total
portfolio is not necessarily a characteristics  of small financial  systems.  Also countries
with more established financial systems display the same trend.  For the OECD countries
Figure 2 shows how equities and bonds have increased in average  from 20 and 31 percent,
respectively to 33 and 38 percent respectively between  1982 and 1996.
Figure 2: Contractual savings  portfolio allocation  in OECD
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investors database.Contractual  Savings In Countries With A Small Financial Sector
In summary, countries with a minimum core of sound banks and insurance companies,
and with sound macroeconomic  are highly likely to benefit from the development of
contractual  savings institutions.  Gains from financial  sector development will initially be
concentrated in the development of the government bond market, and long term lending
through banks.  This would also help developing the sovereign yield curve which is a key
ingredient for further capital market development.  In a second stage benefits would come
from the development of the equity and corporate  bond markets,  and asset backed
securities, which in turn could benefit the development of housing.
In the next sections we discuss the policy options available to countries  that meet the
necessary preconditions for the development of contractual  savings and that have small
financial system.
IV  OPTIONS FOR CONTRACTUAL  SAVINGS DEVELOPMENT
Countries with small financial systems do not generally have a capital market of a viable
scale.  Their small scale often implies that these countries have very few sound and liquid
assets where funds can be invested.  They are characterized by a relative scarcity of
human capital that generally leads to poor regulation  and supervision.  They have a
relatively small population (and hence contributors)  and a higher proportion of migrants
engendering demographic  instability.  Finally, they usually have volatile economies,  have
greater concentration of wealth in the hands of few, and make greater reliance on
patronage so that trustee services only rarely can be successfully provided.
What options have policymakers  in developing contractual  savings in this type of
environment?  For simplicity of exposition we discuss these options under three headings:
i) alternative institutional set-up; ii) competition in the supply of pension services; and iii)
fiduciary responsibility of pension fund managers.
IV.AAlternative institutional set-ups
An important question facing pension reformers concerns the institutional set-up of the
new funded pillar.  Should they authorize only one institution offering one fund to
maximize economies of scale and ensure the same net returns for all workers, at least all
workers of the same generation or cohort?  Should the same institution offer a menu
consisting of several funds allowing for contributors'  choice?  Should reformers
authorize several institutions to encourage competition, innovation and efficiency,  but at
the risk of duplication of services and the higher costs involved with a smaller scale of
operations?  In the latter case, should they authorize specialized institutions with
specialized  funds or should they introduce special retirement  accounts and allow all
financial institutions to offer them?
Different countries have experimented with different approaches.  On the one hand, the
one fund approach has been evident in many countries in the form of a public fund, either
a national provident fund operating a defined contribution  lan or a partially funded
social security corporation  operating a defined benefit plan  . The performance  of the
9 Among the former, the Central Provident Fund (CPF) of Singapore has an excellent operating record,
although the investment returns offered to account holders have been very low.  The funds collected by the
CPF have been invested by other government agencies and the investment returns have probably been very
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social security organizations of Jordan and The Gambia has been acceptable,  combining
reasonably low operating costs with positive real investment returnsl.  However, the
national provident  funds of several African countries, as well as the social security
organizations  of Egypt and some Latin American countries, have suffered from disastrous
financial results with highly negative real returns over long periods.
On the other hand, there is the proposal made by Larry Kotlikoff (1999).  According to
his idea all countries, especially those with underdeveloped financial systems, should hire
a multinational financial  group for the asset management of accumulated funds and
require it to invest passively in a world indexed fund.  A periodic bidding process would
ensure a very low asset management fee, while use of the world index would maximize
risk diversification and benefit from the high returns obtainable in equity markets.  The
Kotlikoff approach  allows for age-specific portfolio allocations  and has the advantage  of
avoiding massive marketing  costs, while offering the same returns, at least to all workers
of the same cohort.  However,  this approach has yet to be adopted by any country or even
by any of the thousands of company pension plans in the United States and other Anglo-
American countries.  While a growing number of large company pension plans opt for
passive investment strategies,  they tend to focus on national  markets and have avoided
allocating  all their funds to a world index fund.  This may reflect dissatisfaction  with the
construction of the world index or the well-known  home bias that characterizes the
operations of pension funds in most countries  (Reisen 1995), but until some of the larger
or more advanced countries were to adopt this solution, it is unlikely that smaller
countries would do so
Most countries that have implemented systemic pension reforns, involving the creation
of mandatory or voluntary funded pension pillars, have followed policies that fall
between these extremes.  Bolivia has organized an international bidding process for the
award of a small number of licenses.  After a protracted process it has selected two
companies led by Spanish banks that satisfied the eligibility criteria (von Gersdorff 1997).
The latter mainly emphasized international expertise in the operation of pension plans
and individual accounts.  It is interesting to note that the two Spanish groups that were
high, given the excellent economic record of Singaporean public corporations.  However, the accounts of
these corporations  are not available for public scrutiny and little is known about their overall performance.
'° The performance  of the national provident funds in Malaysia and Sri Lanka have also been acceptable.  If
we look at the 1961  to 2000 period,  the annual nominal dividend rate (Malaysia being an Islamic country
does not have an interest rate concept ) was 7.04 percent with an annual inflation of 3.49 per cent.  Hence,
The Malaysian EPF has achieved a real dividend rate of of 3.55 percent, after all the management costs,
investment management  costs and so on.  However, even this rate of return has been below the rate of
increase in GDP.  The nominal GDP has been increasing at  10.5 percent, the nominal dividend rate around
8 percent,  so that the replacement rate is going to be relatively low.
" Some countries have public pension funds that move in the direction of passive investment policies that
resemble a world index approach.  Norway, Ireland and Canada are the most prominent cases.  However, in
most of these countries, the public pension funds represent a fraction of accumulated  assets.  Moreover,  the
approaches are new and it remains  to be seen to what extent they will be able to meet their objectives and
resist political interference in their investment policies.  The pension plan that comes closest to the
Kotlikoff proposal is the Thrift Savings Plan instituted in the early  1980s for employees of the federal
government in the United States.  This mandates use of three indexed  funds (specializing in equities, bonds
and money market instruments) and hires asset managers after an elaborate bidding process that contains
extensive safeguards  for ensuring an unbiased selection process.  But even in this case, the plan does not
mandate the use of a world  index fund, but rather funds tracking US securities  markets.
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awarded the two licenses, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya and Argentaria,  later merged, creating a
monopoly situation in the Bolivian pension market.  This impasse was resolved by selling
one of the pension funds to Zurich Finance. The Bolivian case underscores the important
fact that institutional structures are not immutable'2.
The size of the national market should be a determinant of the optimal number of
independent pension funds in countries that opt for open, non-employer funds.  For
instance, among reforming countries,  Colombia, El Salvador and Peru have authorized a
small number of funds (Queisser  1997).  Even so, subsequent mergers resulted in
increased consolidation.  El Salvador now has three funds and Peru five'3. In Eastern
Europe, Hungary started with a very large number of funds in its voluntary  system.  Even
after consolidation,  the voluntary pillar still numbers over 240 funds (Vittas  1995).  The
Czech Republic initially authorized 44 funds but their number has fallen to 20.  The
Czech Republic is the only country where the liquidation of failed pension funds has
resulted in financial losses for workers.  However, the impact on workers has been
mitigated by the fact that the losses have not exceeded the contributions paid by the
government.  In the compulsory pillars of Hungary, Poland and Kazakhstan the number
of funds has been much smaller but it has been higher than the number of surviving funds
in Latin American countries.  This implies considerable scope for further consolidation  in
the pension systems of these countries'  .
12 If anything, institutional structures are always in a constant state of flux.  In Chile, for instance, 13
companies, known as Administradoras  de Fondos de Pensiones  (AFP), were initially authorized  when the
system started in 1981.  Two of these companies merged very early on.  The 12 companies that existed
during the 1980s employed less than 3,000 agents and were able to recruit most of the workers that were
required to participate in the system.  After suffering large losses in the first five years of the new system,
AFPs became highly profitable in the late 1980s and attracted considerable-new  entry.  The number of
AFPs increased to 21 in the early  1990s.  This led to a massive expansion in the number of selling agents
from less than 3,000  in the  1980s to over 15,000 by 1994 (Vittas 1995).  New companies hired agents in an
attempt to lure workers from existing AFPs, while existing companies were forced  to fight back by
expanding their sales forces.  An undesirable result of the growth in the number of companies was a vast
increase in marketing costs, that reached two-thirds of total operating costs and an explosion in the number
of account switching.  At its peak, the annual volume of account transfers involved one out of every two
active accounts.  Very few of the new companies were able to reach critical mass.  Most withdrew from the
market, either by being taken over by other AFPs or by closing down.  The liquidation of a small number of
companies proceeded  smoothly without any financial losses for the workers that had accounts with the
liquidated companies.  The consolidation  process that started in the early  1990s has progressed beyond its
original starting point.  There are now only 7 AFPs in the Chilean system.
13 Argentina and Mexico started  with a larger number of funds (25  and 17 respectively)  but a wave of
mergers has also reduced  the number of funds in these countries  as well.  At the latest count, these stood at
13 in Argentina and  11 in Mexico.  In Mexico,  11  pension funds administrators (AFORES) manage  13
funds (SIEFORES).  I.e., 2 AFORES manage 2 SIEFORES each.  It happens that the second SIEFORE
targets voluntary contributors.
14 In contrast to the countries of Latin America and Eastern Europe that have undertaken  systemic pension
reform in recent years, the pension systems of OECD countries  with large private pension pillars are
characterized  by the presence of a plethora of employer-based pension funds.  In the United States, there
are over 700,000 funds and in the United Kingdom over 200,000.  Australia reports well over 100,000
funds, although the vast majority of these are so-called "pop and mum" funds that cover owners of small
firms and a select number of employees and are specially exempt from the regulatory rigors imposed on
employer, industry and open funds.  Switzerland has over 11,000 funds, but of these only about 4,000 have
affiliated members and function like traditional  funds.  The remainder are funds without members, set as
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Employer funds incur lower marketing  and operating costs because they do not need to
engage in expensive advertising and pay high commissions to selling agents, and because
their operating system can "piggy back" on the pre-existing company payroll system.
Employer funds, unlike public  funds, tend also to have a satisfactory level of investment
performance,  especially in countries that have not imposed quantitative  restrictions but
have relied on the so-called "prudent expert"  approach (Davis 1999).
But workers covered by employer funds face different problems.  If the fund operates a
defined benefit plan, there are restrictions on eligibility, vesting and portability of pension
rights (Vittas and Skully 1991),  while the security of promised benefits  depends on the
continued solvency and integrity of the sponsoring employers  (Bodie 1990).  Initiatives
to tighten the regulations covering these aspects of employer pension funds have resulted
in an accelerated conversion of employer funds from defined benefit to defined
contribution plans15. In the case of defined contribution  plans, large employers tend to
operate efficient funds or to negotiate with specialized financial institutions the offer of
investment and other services on advantageous terms.  But small employers tend to
sponsor plans that incur high operating costs and/or low investment returns, either
because small employers have weaker negotiating powers, or because they are offered
advantageous terms on other types of financial services.  Thus, the record of employer
funds is more mixed than it may appear at first sight'6.
Before concluding this section, mention  should be made of the new Swedish approach
that involves a public central agency for collecting contributions, maintaining individual
account records and paying benefits with a decentralized  asset management  system.
Workers  have the right to direct their funds to several hundred authorized mutual funds.
The latter receive the total funds allocated to them by workers but do not know the
identity of their customers.  This system of so-called "blind accounts"  offers few
incentives for  -irecselling;marketingxpenses  arelimitedAo the creation of a brand
name.  Unlike Chile, the fee schedule is heavily regulated by the central agency (James et
al.  1999).  The system is highly complex and experienced considerable  delay in its
introduction.  It depends for its success on the presence of a highly efficient central
agency and a robust and effective regulation and supervision of the participating mutual
funds.  But it is a highly promising innovation that moves in the direction of regulated
constrained choice.
This brief overview of the experience  of different countries  indicates that the
institutional structure of the pension system depends  on its basic design.  Countries that
rely on closed, employer-based  funds tend to have a much larger number of funds than
countries that rely on open, non-employer funds.  Employer funds avoid marketing costs
and enjoy some economies of scope (and scale for large employers), but their
performance depends on the solvency and integrity of employers as sponsors of pension
financing vehicles often for "top hat" benefits or they are funds in the process of closing down (Queisser
and Vittas 2000).
15  This trend has been most pronounced in Australia, South Africa and New Zealand, but it is now
spreading to other countries with a predominance of defined benefit plans.
l  Unfortunately,  the lack of timely, transparent and comprehensive data has impeded a thorough analysis
of this issue even in countries, such as Canada, Switzerland,  the United Kingdom and the United States,
where employer pension funds have long been a dominant feature of the pension system.
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plans.  The record seems to be positive for the pension funds of large employers, but
rather mixed for the plans of smaller firms.
Countries that rely on open, non-employer funds tend to witness an inexorable
consolidation process that results in the survival of a very small number of funds.  A
consolidated and highly concentrated  pension system based on a small number of open
funds enjoys economies of scale and may avoid excessive marketing costs.  But such a
system poses a serious policy challenge: how to ensure the continuing offer of
competitive and efficient  services.  A solution could be to provide the opportunity to
employers to opt out from the open end system by allowing employer-sponsored plans as
well.
IV.B Competition in the supply of pension services
Glaessner and Valdes-Prieto (1998) provide a framework to assess the role of State and
private sector in providing pensions services in small developing countries.  A similar
approach used for utilities regulation is used to analyze pensions services.  The authors
disaggregate the supply of pensions services into elementary functions and discuss the
extent to which policy makers would want to promote competition in the supply of any of
these services.
As shown in Table 3, services like the collection of contributions, data processing,
maintenance of records and accounts, channeling of funds to asset managers, and
payment of benefits are likely to benefit from significant economies of scale (Glaessner
and Vald6s-Prieto  1998, James et al.  1999)17.  The sunk costs associated with the
provision of these services could be avoided by countries with small financial systems
and little resources  by attracting investments from highly reputable foreign companies.
Glaessner and Valdes-Prieto (1998)  also note that the small size of the market for pension
services in small countries limits the interest of-foreign- direct-investors-in providing such
services locally.  The total revenues in terms of commission fees could be much less than
10 million US dollars per year in countries with less than 500,000 active contributors and
17 This issue is addressed further below, but at this point it is important to note that several countries have
tried  to lower the operating costs of the funded pension pillar by mandating  the use of a central agency.
The cost benefits from using a centralized agency have long been argued by many commentators  with
attention drawn to the excellent operating record of the Central Provident Fund of Singapore (Vittas 1993).
Several countries,  including Argentina, Hungary, Kazakhstan  and Poland, have tried to avoid the example
of Chile and mandated the use of central collection agencies.  However,  almost all these countries made the
serious mistake of assigning  this important function to pre-existing public institutions with a long record of
inefficiency  and incompetence.  The result, as exemplified by the experience of Poland and Kazakhstan,
has been a long period of lost records, unaccounted money, misdirected funds, asset management
companies that could not tell their customers where their money had gone, and workers that did not know if
their employers had forwarded to the central agency the contributions  withheld from their salaries.  Mexico
seems to be the only reforming country that has assigned this function to a central clearing agency jointly-
owned by private sector institutions.  Its record  appears to be better than that of the public central agencies
of Poland and other countries, but in Mexico the new agency built on the disastrous lessons of the previous,
ill-fated program of 1992 (Cerda and Grandolini  1998).  No other country seems to have come anywhere
near the excellent operating record of Singapore.  Yet the poor performance  of the CPF in the investment
returns offered to account holders has marred its record.  On a net investment return basis,  which is what
ultimately  counts for individual workers, the record of the CPF is far from enviable.
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wage rates of less than $500 per month.  In such cases, major foreign companies  would
have little interest in investing directly in setting up a local branch or agency.
Table 3: The supply of pensions services
Function  Description  Economies of Scale/Scope
Collection of  Collection of contributions  Economies of scope stem from three sources: i) employers have to
contributions  from employers and  fill different forms at different times for different collection services;
distribution of the same to  ii) the cost borne by the employer decreases with the number of
fund managers  collection agencies; and iii) forms can be consolidated  in a unique
collection process.
Small countries with well functioning personal income taxation
system may want to create a nationalized monopoly for the
collection  of contributors.  Small countries with badly functioning
personal income taxation system may want to create self regulated
open capital company with shareholders including the entities
benefiting from the collection services.  (Mexico)
Data processing  Data entry control  Economies of scope stem from the specialized know-how and
technology linked to this function.  However,  costs from 'data
capture"  are proportional to the number of participants and small
countries would be beKter off by subcontracting this function to an
extemal (offshore) entity.  This is common for credit card data
processing activity.
Accounting and  Valuation of assets and  Economies of scale stem from the fixed costs of specialized
maintenance of  liabilities for the fund or in  hardware and software.  Small countries with few contributors would
records  individual accounts,  not benefit from these economies and would be beKter off by
reconciliation of accounts to  subcontracting abroad this function.
produce updated balances
Client services  Distribution of account  Costs are usually proportional to the number of participants to the
statements,  dealing with  system and do not generate economies of scale.  Small countries
complaints, and answers to  would only be constrained in the local development of this function
enquiries.  by the excessive standards required  by the regulation.
Portfolio  Asset management (active or  Not characterized by large sunk costs.  The lack of financial
investment  passive) and analysis of  expertise, illiquidity of the market, and concentration of interests in
management  investment opportunities.  small countries could lead to price manipulation  or conflict of
intefrsts.  Small countries would We-bettK  off by allowing f6reign
asset managers to take care of this function.
Insurance  Related to the provision of  Small countries are characterized  by limited pools and lack of asset
benefits  diversification.  For this reason, the provision of insurance benefits
(disability, survivorship, or longevity insurance) should either be
heavily reinsured abroad or simply provided by foreign companies
through cross border services.
Payment of  Calculation of benefits and  Economies  of scale stem from the widespread  geographic
benefits  transfer of cash to  coverage.  Small countries with poor distribution  networks (banks or
beneficiaries' accounts.  post offices) would be better off by centralizing this function.  The,
option of a self regulated open capital company with shareholders
including entities benefiting from the distribution of benefits seems
to be the most suitable for small countries.
Source: Glaessner and Valdes-Prieto  (1998).
Whenever the small size of a country does not justify the sunk costs that characterizes
some of the pensions services it might be necessary to allow foreign firms to centralize
these services in a foreign location, where production costs could be lower and provided
communication services are efficient and data privacy can be ensured.  Several largeContractual Savings In Countries With A Small Financial Sector
financial groups already use shared local services in their operations  in different
countries
Allowing for the subcontracting of services in the open market and for the use of cross-
border providers would pemlit a more efficient unbundling of services and the emergence
of greater competition in specific services, such as asset management,  where economies
of scale may be less dominant.  In this way, the markets for the provision of pension
services would become more contestable  and would limit the potential  adverse effects of
the growing concentration of these markets.  The rational for subcontracting  arises
especially  since countries with small financial systems have small population and hence,
likely to have a small pool of human capital with required expertise for an efficient
operation  of pension funds19. Many Latin American countries that reformed their
pension systems, have allowed, even encouraged,  foreign participation in their private
pension pillar.  In some cases, Chilean-style pension funds played a prominent part (e.g.
in Peru and El Salvador).  In other cases, foreign banks and insurance companies
submitted applications in joint ventures with large local institution  0.  In the Czech
Republic and Hungary, foreign presence was not very large at the launch of the voluntary
pillars in 1994.  But in both Hungary and the Czech Republic  there was a  growing
presence of foreign institutions over time.  Foreign  institutions now control more than 85
percent of the assets of pension funds in both countries.  The growing foreign presence
was linked to the consolidation of the banking and insurance sectors  and the
implementation  of the privatization of large local institutions by sale to foreign strategic
investors21.
'8 For instance, the ING pension fund in the Czech Republic shares many services with the local subsidiary
of Nationale Nederlanden, the insurance arm of ING, while the investment of funds is subcontracted to the
local ING asset management company.  Using centralized services in another country  would reduce
operating costs, both because of greater economies of scale and because of the location of such centralized
services  in countries with lower labor costs.
19  In Chile, at the beginning of the new system, no foreign companies were involved.  As the rules did not
allow the participation  of banks,  several of the early AFPs were set up by trade unions (despite the
opposition of the government)  and trade associations (the association of construction companies  established
Habitat,  one of the most successful  AFPs).  Foreign companies  entered the system in the early 1980s,
probably in response to the early problems experienced by the new pension system.  These included the
adverse effects of the banking crisis of 1982-3,  but especially the inability of local operators to maintain the
high level of capital reserves that were initially required by the regulatory framework.  Bankers Trust
acquired a controlling stake in Provida  (the largest company in the system), Aetna Insurance in Santa
Maria  and American International  Group (AIG) in a joint venture with Bank of  Boston (now part of Fleet
Boston)  in Union.  Bankers Trust sold its stake in Provida at a big profit in the early  1990s, benefiting
from its success, while AIG and Fleet Boston withdrew from the market after failing to achieve a
significant market share.  Today, the AFP system is dominated by 2 Spanish banks (BBVA that has bought
a controlling stake in Provida  in recent years and BSCH in Summa Santander), an American bank (Citibank
in Habitat), a Canadian insurance company (Sun Life in Cuprum) and an American  insurance company
(Aetna in Santa Maria).
20 In Argentina, when the system was set up in 1994 the four or five largest Administradoras  de Fondos  de
Jubilaciones  y Pensiones  (AFJP) were joint ventures of foreign and local institutions.
21  When Hungary introduced its mandatory pillar in 1998, foreign banks and insurance companies held a
dominant stake in the small number of mandatory funds that were authorized.  Foreign institutions were
also present  in the establishment of the mandatory pillar of Poland.  In Argentina, and more recently
Mexico,  the sale of large private banks and insurance companies  to foreign strategic investors has resulted
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Reputable foreign institutions benefit from a number of operational  advantages.  They
know how to operate efficiently systems with a large number of individual accounts.
They have experience  in cross selling and exploiting both economies of scale and scope.
They have a well established expertise in asset management.  And they are in a better
position to resist government pressure and political interference in their day-to-day
operations.  They are also better able to integrate their local operations with their global
activities and, by implication,  with global markets.  Finally, in their activity, foreign
institutions train local staff and contribute to the improvement of the quality of skills.
It is worth noting that "the easy equation 'foreign equals good'  is not always valid"
(Bossone, et al.  2000).  The authors make this comment in relation to the strategic
investments of foreign banks in Hungary where not all of the purchasers  were prime
institutions  and where some were suspected of laundering money.  However, even in the
absence of criminal activities,  the record of foreign institutions is far from stellar.  For
instance, the performance of the pension funds owned by foreign institutions has been
erratic, especially in Eastern Europe.  Investment returns and operating fees have been
unremarkable,  the quality of service has left much to be desired, and the expected
contribution toward creating a competitive and efficient  system has been only partially
met.  Nevertheless, as in the case of banking and insurance, foreign pension funds have
been able to operate with fewer problems,  have not engaged in fraudulent  or imprudent
activities, and have taken steps to enhance further their operating and investment
efficiency.  The institutions that have devoted significant management resources and have
placed local nationals in key management positions have performed better than those that
have adopted a passive approach and have relied on expatriate  management.
Countries with small and underdeveloped financial systems that engage in pension
reform need to invite foreign banks, insurance  companies and asset managers to play an
active and central part in the establishment of the new private pillars.  Ideally, foreign
institutions  should be encouraged to join forces  with local groups, who know the local
markets and can help them overcome any public opposition to the reform program.
However,  in the process of procuring financial expertise  from abroad, small countries
need to be particularly careful in allowing only highly reputable institutions to service
their market.  Highly reputable companies have also the incentive to perform up to
expectation  as their reputation costs are very high.
Moreover,  by attracting reputable foreign companies, reforming countries  would
reduce the costs of supervision which may take time to develop to meet adequate
standards.  Reforming countries usually need also to enhance prudential regulation and
supervision.  Reputable foreign companies  are usually domiciliated in developed market
economy countries with a strong home country regulation.  They could provide the host
country with a transition period during which regulation and supervision are updated
whilst effective regulation and supervision is carried out by the home country.  In fact, it
is more and more common for international regulators  to share information about
questionable international companies.  In this framework the host country needs to
in a consolidation and expansion of the already significant presence of foreign banks and insurance
companies  in the pension system.
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develop strong links with the home country supervisory  authority and sign memorandum
of understanding for the exchange of inforrnation.
IV. C The fiduciary  responsibility  of  pension fund managers
Governments in developing countries often see contractual savings development as a
captive source of finance for fiscal deficit or targeted industries.  If not an alternative to
debt monetization,  these funds are often seen as a pool of funds for "developing" the
economy.  This forced development often means always two things: i) direct government
control of asset management  and direct investment into target industries,  housing, and
failing banks; and/or ii) prohibition of foreign investments by contractual savings.  We
discuss these two aspects  in turn.
IV.C.1 Trustee services
State intervention in the allocation of pension funds is, unfortunately,  the norm, rather
than the exception in many developing countries.  Public pension funds are regularly
treated as captive source of funds and in many countries and this has seriously
undermined  the provision of old age pensions.  Iglesias and Palacios (2000) survey the
management  of public pension schemes reserves.  They find that "public pension funds
are usually subject to a series of restrictions  and mandates that produce poor returns.  The
non-pension  objectives of the government  often lead to social and economically targeted
investments and forced loans to the government to finance its deficits.  These investments
yield returns that are often below bank deposit rates and almost always below the growth
of incomes.  This contrasts with privately-managed  pension fund returns, which generally
exceed income growth.  The worst returns are produced by publicly-managed pension
funds in countries  with poor governance records".
Figure 3 summarizes the above statement by plotting the average real return on public
pensions assets for 20 developing and developed countries against a governance  index22.
The relationship is highly non linear with rapidly diminishing marginal utility of
governance.  In other words, country like Uganda could improve considerably the rate of
23 return on public pension assets with very limited governance  improvement
22 The index used is the governance index used in Mauro (1995)  for all countries with the exception of
Zambia, Uganda, Costa Rica, and Guatemala for which,  the Corruption Index  produced by Transparency
International  was used.  Higher levels of the index  indicate higher degrees of governance.
23 Notice however,  that the relationship presented does not imply causality but mere correlation.
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Figure 3: Pension annual real return and governance
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Table 4 presents summary statistics for the data used in Iglesias and Palacios (2000).
In the first column of the table the correlation between the annual real rate of return and
the governance index is 0.49 and significantly different from zero with a p-value of 2.7%.
This is the summary statistics of the relationship depicted in Figure 3. Similar results can
be obtained by looking at the third column in the same table.  The correlation  between the
standardized real rate of return of pensions assets and governance  is now 0.38  and
significantly different from zero at  10%.
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Table 4: Pension annual real rate of return and governance
RR  STD  RR/STD  Govemance
Rate of return  (RR)  1.0000
Standard deviation (STD)  -0.8836  1.0000
p-value  [0.0000]
RR/STD  0.6746  -0.5456  1.0000
p-value  [0.0006]  [0.0086]
Governance  0.4937  -0.4664  0.3787  1.0000
p-value  [0.0269]  [0.0382]  [0.0997]
Source:  Authors'  calculation  from Iglesias  and Palacios  (2000)
Iglesias and Palacios (2000) use this data to compare the return of private pension with
the return on public pension funds and inevitably find that public funds have been
mismanaged in many countries and that private pensions are one way to introduce
discipline in asset management.  The interference of governments can be detrimental
when investment policies are  guided by objectives unrelated to the maximization of
return on pensions assets.  Low rates of returns on pension contributions induce
distortions on the labor market as contributions  are increasingly perceived as income tax.
As a result, savings are not allocated to the most efficient use.  Clearly  governments want
to overcome a situation of economic impasse by targeting key industries.  However, the
recourse to coercive regulation  and captive source of funds is the short term answer to a
credibility problem on the part of the government that prompts investors to impose high
risk premia on future nominal interest rates24. What is not realized, or probably only
underestimated,  is that the use of captive source of funds only reinforce investors'
expectations  and seriously undermines the development of financial markets.  When
financial  markets are not developed financial innovation  is hampered and the cost of_-
capital remains high.  Hence, efficient mobilization  of savings and allocation of resources
are denied.  Furthermore,  when these captive source of funds involve  social security
schemes, the provision of adequate pension benefits is undermined;  and the implicit debt
of the government inflated.
Specific recommendations  can be made for small developing countries.  In these
countries the reduced dimension of institutional relationships,  the relative scarcity of
human capital, the greater concentration of wealth, and a relatively less independent civil
service facilitate concentration of functions, interference by third parties and more
generally weak governance.  Glaessner and Vald6s-Prieto  (1996) argue that in the
provision of pension services in small countries,  it is essential that the supply of trustee
services and governance  be maximized.  Not only is it important to procure, maybe
abroad as previously mentioned,  services from highly reputable companies, but it is as
important to supply highly independent trustee services.  These greatly influence the
performance  of pension funds by hiring and selecting asset managers,  determining
investment policies, selecting auditors, and asset custodians.  The number of trustees  per
24 The US social security trust fund can only be invested  in non-tradable government securities.  However,
the credibility of the macroeceonomic  policy of the US government is not at stake and this exception to the
reasoning before made can easily be explained in this way.  Very different would be the situation if fiscal
discipline in the US  were non-existent as in many developing countries.
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pension fund should be high enough not to expose  them to undue interferences.  The
number of trustees should be higher the larger is the share of the portfolio invested
locally.  As far as the selection of trustee is concerned Glaessner and Valdes-Prieto  (1996)
argue that in countries with weak governance  structures, a pension system based on
competitive  selection of pension funds management companies  by individual contributors
can insulate the trustees from undue interference.
IV.C.2 International  investments
Policy makers in small developing countries often look with suspicion at the option of
liberalizing foreign investment by contractual  savings.  The economic literature looks at
capital  controls from the point of view that free intertemporal  trade is welfare
enhancing25. Hence, controls reduce social welfare but could be taken into consideration
if their introduction mitigates the effects of some other market failure.  Exchange controls
are generally used in developing countries to protect the tax base and prevent "capital
flight".  Capital flows (inflows) are controlled  to reduce moral hazard when the State
maintains explicit or implicit guarantees  for bank liabilities.  Other market failures relate
to sticky prices in goods and labor market, anticipated trade reforms, and short term
private speculation ("hot money").  Small open economies are particularly exposed to the
consequence  deriving from capital mobility and in countries with weak financial systems
capital flows are also controlled to reduce the possibility of financial crises.  For instance,
net capital inflows in the Asian crisis-affected countries went from 6.3% of GDP in 1995
and 5.8% in 1996 to -2% in  1997 and 5.2% in 1998 (Takaoshi  and Kreuger 2001).  Such
deep swings can induce volatility of the real exchange rate.  If authorities are interested in
avoiding real exchange rate volatility, considered detrimental to export-led growth, they
will try to sterilize these flows.  In extreme cases only exchange  control can prevent the
exhaustion of foreign reserves.
-In  his survey, Dooley (1996) finds evidence  that capital  controls have been successful
in maintaining interest differentials  in both developed and developing countries.  These
controls have been used, together with other forms of financial repression, to increase net
fiscal revenues  (Aizenman and Guidotti 1994).  However,  the data does not support the
idea that capital controls have been successful in affecting the volume and composition  of
private capital flows, changes in international reserves, the level of the exchange rate, or
even effective in fending off speculative  attacks in countries with inconsistent regimes or
macroeconomic  policies.
Whatever the rational of exchange  controls, should they be applied to contractual
savings?  Fontaine (1997) surveys the Chilean  experience in allowing foreign investment
by pension funds.  Only in March  1990 were pension funds allowed to invest abroad,
almost  10 years after the pension reform.  At that time, regulation allowed foreign
investment of up to 3% of portfolio  in fixed income securities issued by low risk
countries and banks.  In 1995  investment in foreign shares was allowed with a limit of
25 The strand of the literature on multiple equilibria argues that capital control are a first best temporary
solution enabling governments  to increase their reputation and improve fundamentals so that self-fulfilling
speculative attacks are less likely.  The removal of controls can be seen by the market as a further
commitment of governments  in establishing  even better reputation.  See,  and the list is not exhaustive,
Obstfeld  1986a, 1986b,  1994, and 1996, Laban and Larrain 1997, and Bartolini and Drazen  1997.
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12% of total portfolio.  The paper concludes that there are no (good) macroeconomic
reasons to treat international  investment by pension funds differently from local ones.  In
other words,  foreign investment by pension funds should be subject the same (mutatis
mutandis) rules of diversification  applied to domestic investments.  However, Fontaine
(1997: 269-270),  argues that imposing restrictions on foreign investment by pension
funds is desirable during the transition phase of a pension reform.  This would serve the
double purpose of: i) develop the domestic capital market; and ii) help the public sector
ease the fiscal cost of transition between a PAYG and a fully funded scheme.
Restrictions on flows only should also be imposed during balance of payment crises and
if asset stocks are large.  This would limit volatility of capital flows and its impact on the
real exchange rate (Davis  1999 and Fontaine  1997).  However, restrictions on foreign
investments would induce mispricing of domestic shares which is not the way to go to
develop the domestic stock market.  Despite a non well specified political economy
rational  for strict prudential regulation during the transition phase of a pension reform,
the paper underestimates  the risks involved in treating contractual  savings as a captive
source of finance.  It is true that an efficient way to finance the cost of transition from a
PAYG to a fully funded system would be to rely on the demand of govemment debt by
pension funds.  However, this strategy could undermine the credibility of the pension
reform (hence, its success) should the government have weak credibility of respecting
fiscal discipline.  Unfortunately,  governments have often relied on their powers of
coercion to ensure sufficient demand for their debt to finance explosive expenditure,  or of
other targeted securities to finance well connected entrepreneurs.  Sometimes it is the
case that regulations require commercial  banks to meet reserve requirements by holding
government paper.  Other times, and both in developing and in developed countries,
commercial  banks, insurance companies, pension funds, as well as social security funds,
are required to invest in government bonds, sometimes in specially issued non-
marketable  instruments with substantially below-market  yields.  Finally, many countries
impose minimum quantitative floors of assets to be invested in government paper26 and
politicians are often allowed to have a say in the investment policy of social security
funds27. Obviously, these policies will increase the country risk premium and the cost of
borrowing to the private sector, which may slow down the economy.  The declining
econornic  activity will ultimately reduce the government capacity to collect revenue and
to service its debt.
The economic literature clearly supports free intertemporal trade as welfare enhancing.
All rationales for introducing capital controls find limited support in the empirical
literature.  Their maintenance can greatly reduce the credibility of the macroeconomic
26 Prior to  1986, the Senegalese government forced commercial  banks to invest a share of their assets in
government bonds.  After the collapse of the banking sector in  1986 regulation was relaxed.  In the
Philippines,  the Social Security System (SSS) and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) are
"offered" tax free government bonds that remain tax free to the extent that they are not subsequently traded.
Hence forcing the two social security institutions  to hold these assets until maturity.  In Singapore, the
Central Provident Fund is still required to invest a large share of its assets  in non-marketable  government
securities;  and only until recently this share  was 100%.
27 In the Philippines,  SSS and GSIS were often instructed  to provide direct lending to industries to which
commercial banks refused to lend.  In Mexico as well as in the Philippines a large share of pension
contributions needs investing in housing, INFONAVIT and Pag-IBIG,  respectively.  The real return of the
assets of these "specialized"  institutions have been rather disappointing.
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stance in countries with a poor record of economic discipline.  Small  open economies
(and above all, developing economies)  should allow foreign investment by contractual
savings should the credibility of their macroeconomic policy allow it.  In other words,
only countries with credible macroeconomic  policies should attempt developing
contractual  savings.  A quantitative limit on the flow of foreign investment might be
justified because of the vulnerability of a small financial system to excessive capital flow
volatility.  However,  it is here taken for granted that some minimum needs to be invested
abroad for diversification  purposes and that flows can be limited to protect the balance of
payments.  Countries that need to impose foreign investment restrictions on the stock of
contractual  savings assets because of balance of payments concerns are countries with an
unstable macroeconomic environment.  These countries need first to stabilize their
economies before  attempting to develop contractual  savings and hence their financial
systems.
V  CONCLUSIONS
The development of contractual  savings is strictly related to the implementation  of a
pension reform involving the establishment of funded pillars.  However, no discussion is
made here of system design issues that vary from country to country and are the result of
various and diverse constraints.  The conclusions we present here are summarized in
Table 5.
Countries with small financial  systems are generally small open economies with a high
mobility of labor and a restricted pool of human capital.  Apart from the demographic
instability that this may engender, the short supply of human capital  suggests that local
financial expertise is also constrained.  Moreover,  the reduced dimension of institutional
relationships, the greater concentration  of wealth, and a relatively less independent civil
service facilitate -concentration of functions and more generally weak governance.
Not all countries with small financial systems are likely to be able to successfully
develop contractual  savings.  Only countries with relatively high levels of per capita
income are good candidates for a successful development of contractual savings.
Moreover,  a basic core of sound banks and insurance companies, as well as credible long
commitment on the part of Governments  to implement sound and transparent
macroeconomic  policies  are also needed.
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Table 5: Contractual savings development options
Preconditions
- Relatively high per-capita  income (GDP/Pop >=  US$ 2,000)
-Credible  and transparent macroeconomic  policies and commitment to economic reforns  (fiscal, financial, and labor
markets).
- Open capital account
- Sound core of banks  and insurance companies
- Commitment to development of sound regulatcy and supervisory frameworks.
Focus  Policy options
areas
- Allow bidding process among a limited  number of open end funds.
Institutional set-  Allow funds to offer a menu of foreign mutual funds.
Intiutional  Allow for employer sponsored funds.
up  - Require separation of assets from sponsor company.
-Allow small employers to contract scheme  arrangements with larger funds.
- Unbundle services into simpler components to be contracted out.
Supply of  -Attract local investment from highly reputable companies in  the services of: collection of
pension  contributions, data processing,  maintenance of records and accounts, channeling of funds to asset
services  managers, and payment of benefits.
- Subcontract same services abroad if small scale discourages foreign investments.
Fiduciary  - Require the use of an appropriate number of trustees.
responsibilities  - Require the use of independent custodians (Central Bank or reputable intermediaries).
P  Allow foreign investments of assets.
Regulatory and  - Develop at first minimum  regulatory and supervisory capacity focusing on high standards (information
Supervisory  disclosure, IT,  investment policies, govemance, asset management)  for local and foreign participants.
sts  - Further develop regulation and supervision relying on frequent and detailed exchange of information
Costs  ~~with home pro-active supervisors.
What are the options available to small countries that meet the preconditions above
mentioned?  Above all, these countries need to integrate with global financial  markets to
develop contractual  savings.  This implies essentially to things: i) foreign ownership of
intermediaries by reputable companies,  possibly in the form of joint ventures; and ii)
investment portfolios need to be properly diversified both locally and internationally  as
the implementation of credible and sound macroeconomic policies  allow full opening of
capital accounts.  It is essential that in the process of integration countries with small
financial systems use reputable foreign companies.  The use of foreign companies can be
done at the level of asset managers where funds are centrally collected and asset
managers  periodically bid for a license to manage assets.  Alternatively,  a menu of local
and foreign mutual funds can be offered, allowing contributors to chose among the
admitted mutual funds.
If integration with global financial markets is the key element for developing
contractual  savings, what are the tools available to countries with small financial market
to achieve such integration?  One way to answer this question is to look at the solutions
adopted by other countries around the world in three key areas:  i) institutional set-ups; ii)
competition in the supply of pension services; and iii) fiduciary responsibilities.
As far as institutional set-ups are concerned,  countries that have relied on closed,
employer-based funds have generally witnessed a much larger number of funds than
countries that have relied on open, non-employer funds.  Employer funds avoid
marketing costs and enjoy some economies of scope (and scale for large employers),  but
their performance depends on the solvency and integrity of employers as sponsors of
pension plans.  The record seems to be positive for the pension funds of large employers,
but rather mixed for the plans of smaller firms.  Countries that have relied on open, non-
employer funds have generally witnessed an inexorable consolidation process that
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resulted in the survival of a very small number of funds.  A consolidated  and highly
concentrated  pension system based on a small number of open funds enjoys economies of
scale  and may avoid excessive  marketing costs.  But such a system poses a serious policy
challenge:  how to ensure the continuing offer of competitive  and efficient services.  One
solution to this dilemma could be to promote contestability by allowing employers to opt
out from the open end system through the offer of employer-sponsored plans as well.
Economies  of scale and scope are large in many areas of the supply of pension services
like collection of contributions, data processing, maintenance  of records,  channeling of
funds to asset managers and payment of benefits.  Countries may not be able to
successfully attract investment from highly reputable foreign companies in these area
because of their small size.  Whenever the small size of a country does not justify the
sunk costs that characterizes  some of the pensions services it might be necessary to allow
foreign firms to centralize these services in a foreign location.  Using centralized services
in another country would reduce operating costs, both because of greater economies  of
scale and because of the location of such centralized services in countries with lower
labor costs.
Countries with small financial systems may also have a small pool of human capital
with the necessary expertise to manage pension funds.  The countries need to contract
reputable foreign companies, either to join local ventures or directly abroad.  These
companies would know how to operate efficiently systems with a large number of
individual  accounts.  They would have experience in cross selling and exploiting both
economies of scale and scope.  They would have a well established expertise in asset
management.  They would be in a better position to resist government pressure  and
political interference  in their day-to-day operations.  They would also be better able to
integrate their local operations with their global activities and, by implication,  with global
markets.  In their ativity,foreign institutions would train local staff and contribute to the
improvement of the quality of skills.  Finally, by attracting reputable foreign companies,
reforming countries would reduce the costs of supervision which may take time to
develop to meet adequate standards.  The host country would have to rely on the
providers' home country supervisory authorities; hence would need to enter into
agreements with each of them to share information about the solvency of intermediaries.
Finally, countries with small financial systems need to ensure that the fiduciary
responsibilities of fund managers are properly met.  Contractual savings in developing
countries are often seen as a captive source of funds for targeted development of specific
industries,  sectors, or markets.  Contractual savings represent  long term savings that
should be managed in the best interest of beneficiaries and not used as development  tools.
They are not developmental tools.  In this sense it is very important that the supply of
trustee services and governance be maximized.  Trustees need to be independent from
political interference and this can often be achieved by allowing for competitive selection
of pension funds management  companies by individual contributors.
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